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Abstract
We propose a unified framework bridging the gap between team and
competition issues, in order to reconsider the social value of private and
public information in price and quantity games, when information is both
imperfect and dispersed, and to compare the corresponding outcomes in
terms of equilibrium and social welfare. In addition to the well-known
strategy distortion (from the point of view of the team problem), the
competition motive introduces an informational distortion which may lead
to a negative social value of private information and reverse the perfect
information result in favor of strategic substitutability as the source of
higher profit and social welfare.
Keywords: beauty contest, competition, coordination, strategic comple-
mentarity, anti-coordination, strategic substitutability, price game, quantity
game, dispersed information, public information.
JEL codes: D43, D82, L13.
1 Introduction
The payoffs of Keynes’ beauty contest, as modelled by Morris and Shin (2002),
involve three motives (Cornand and Heinemann, 2008): a fundamental motive,
making agents strive to predict and fit some exogenous fundamental value, a
coordination motive, giving them an incentive to match the conventional value
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Gardete, two anonymous referees, and the participants to the workshop ”Coordination in
Economics” organized from May 29th to June 3rd 2017 at the Fondation des Treilles, plus the
Foundation itself for the corresponding financial support.
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to be set by the market, and a competition motive, making them better off when
beating the market.
Should information be perfect, the fundamental and the coordination mo-
tives would be compatible: all agents would simply coordinate on the funda-
mental value. As information becomes imperfect, blurring the fundamental,
and dispersed, obstructing coordination, a conflict emerges between the funda-
mental and coordination motives. The competition motive introduces a further
conflict, even in the absence of informational frictions, since pursuing the coor-
dination and the competition motives means meeting and beating the market
at the same time. While the conflict between the fundamental and the coordi-
nation motives has been largely explored in the beauty contest literature, less
attention has been paid to the influence of the competition motive, which we
want to emphasize now as a source of inefficiency under perfect as well as under
imperfect and dispersed information.
Our contribution consists in building a unified framework bridging the gap
between team and competition issues. On the one hand, this unified framework
allows us to reconsider the social value of private and public information in a
large category of contexts going beyond the Keynesian beauty contest, since
they extend from situations of strategic complementarity generated by the co-
ordination motive to situations of strategic substitutability resulting from an
anti -coordination motive, when agents want to move away from each other.
On the other hand, it enables us to formulate direct comparisons between the
performances of price and quantity games when information is imperfect and
dispersed.
To obtain the unified framework and capture the specific impact of the com-
petition motive, we model an economy with a simple multidivisional company,1
where each division supplies a diversified good and is assigned to maximize
a convex combination of its own profit and of the company joint profit. We
thus obtain as polar cases full competition (leading to a standard oligopolis-
tic equilibrium) and full cooperation (entailing the collusive solution).2 The
latter outcome, the solution to a team problem, is of course efficient from the
company’s point of view and may be taken as a benchmark.
The model is studied in the context of both price and quantity games. Intro-
ducing the competition motive has two effects. First, independently from infor-
mational issues, this motive distorts the equilibrium strategies away from their
1On the multidivisional form of organization, see Mahoney (1992).
2As suggested by the very terminology we are using, an alternative interpretation of our
model is that of an oligopolistic market for diversified goods, in which firms engage in a more
or less cooperative conduct. Related literature has generally considered only the two extreme
conducts, resulting in standard Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly equilibria or in the monopoly
solution (Amir et al., 2010, and Amir et al., 2016, respectively, are good representatives of
this methodological choice). We consider instead any possible semi-cooperative conduct, but
the conditions underlying the choice and the enforcement of such conduct by an independent
firm are not contemplated in the present analysis. Using a model of differentiated duopoly,
Cornand and Dos Santos Ferreira (2017) focus upon the strategic choice by firm owners of
the degree of cooperation ruling the conduct of firm managers, hence upon the endogeneity
of the relative weight to be attributed to the competition (and coordination) motive(s).
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efficient value, thus generating a (price or quantity) strategy distortion. Second,
under coexisting public and private information on the stochastic fundamental
(the market size), the competition motive distorts the relative weights put on the
two kinds of information, generating an informational distortion, which counter-
vails the effect of the coordination (or anti-coordination) motive. In both price
and quantity games, the informational distortion generated by the competition
motive thus translates into an inefficiently low weight on the public signal in the
presence of the coordination motive (hence under strategic complementarity),
and into an inefficiently high weight on the public signal in the presence of the
anti-coordination motive (hence under strategic substitutability).
After examining the well-known case of perfect information where the com-
petition motive is responsible for the sole strategy distortion, we first establish
some results regarding the social value of information. In the absence of the com-
petition motive, but also when this motive combines with the anti-coordination
motive (hence under strategic substitutability), the social value of both pub-
lic and private information is always positive. By contrast, when it combines
with the coordination motive (hence under strategic complementarity), while
the social value of public information is still positive, that of private infor-
mation becomes negative for a high enough intensity of competition. Indeed,
increasing the precision of either public or private information directly helps
divisions better predict the fundamentals, but may also augment the informa-
tional distortion. This additional effect of an increase in the precision of private
information results under strategic complementarity in an excessive weight put
on the private signal. The negative indirect effect eventually dominates the
positive direct effect as the intensity of competition becomes larger and larger,
reducing the importance of the fundamental motive.
We finally compare from a welfare point of view the outcomes of the price
and quantity games. Under imperfect and dispersed information, the efficient
and socially optimal3 uses of information coincide in the absence of the com-
petition motive, ensuring higher performance levels under the influence of anti-
coordination rather than coordination (hence under strategic substitutability
rather than strategic complementarity). This result obtains under the sole in-
fluence of the coordination/anti-coordination motive and only for informational
reasons. However, the competition motive may reverse the result, as it generates
strategy and informational distortions with opposite effects on social welfare. If
the information quality is low (under small precisions of both public and pri-
vate signals), the effect of the informational distortion dominates the effect of
the strategy distortion, so that profit and social welfare are higher with the co-
ordination motive (hence under strategic complementarity). Interestingly, the
informational distortion generated by the competition motive thus mitigates
the perfect information result in favor of anti-coordination (hence of strategic
3Our economy is reduced to a representative consumer with quasilinear utility and to a
multidivisional company. This modelling approach rationalizes the standard view of ”social”
welfare (here identified with consumer’s added utility) as the sum of the consumer surplus
and distributed profits. Clearly, in a more diversified economy with profits distributed to only
part of the consumers, the evaluation of social welfare would be more problematic.
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substitutability).
The paper contributes to two main strands of the literature. First, it be-
longs to the growing literature on the social value of information initiated by
Morris and Shin (2002), highlighting the conflict between the fundamental and
the coordination motives, and showing that an increase in the precision of pub-
lic information is harmful in a context of strategic complementarity if private
information is already precise enough. This result is largely due to the presence
of the sole fundamental motive in the social welfare function, the coordination
motive being exactly counterbalanced by the competition motive in Morris and
Shin’s framework. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) show that Morris and Shin’s re-
sult must indeed be qualified, in particular by referring to the relation between
the equilibrium and the efficient uses of information. Also, Ui and Yoshizawa
(2015) characterize the social value of information in symmetric quadratic-payoff
games for a larger class of environments than Angeletos and Pavan.4 Both pro-
pose IO (Bertrand and Cournot) applications, without pointing to the source
of the discrepancy between the equilibrium and efficient uses of information,
namely the competition motive.5 The same IO illustrations of beauty contest
games, used to emphasize the conflict between the fundamental and the coordi-
nation motives, appear in Myatt and Wallace (2012, 2015, 2018). By taking as
the fundamental targets pursued by the oligopolistic firms the Bertrand and the
Cournot equilibrium strategies, Myatt and Wallace merge the fundamental and
competition motives. Such a procedure does not allow to consider the effect of
the competition motive separately, which is our aim in the present paper. We
take instead the collusive strategies as the fundamental targets, which allows us
to disentangle the fundamental and the competition motives.
Second, the paper extends to a context of imperfect and dispersed informa-
tion the systematic comparison of price and quantity competition initiated by
Singh and Vives (1984) for a differentiated duopoly with linear demand (recent
contributions, also under perfect information, are provided by Amir and Jin,
2001, and Amir, Erickson and Jin, 2017). In the same vein, we observe the de-
velopment of a literature on the aggregation of private information in oligopolies
with either demand or cost uncertainty6 (Raith, 1996, Vives, 1988, 2011). This
literature goes beyond the scope of the present paper in dealing with firms’
strategic decisions concerning information sharing and acquisition, or else with
private information revelation at equilibrium. Nonetheless, our work could have
4In particular, they also establish results for certain games with a finite number of players,
which are useful for applications such as oligopoly games. Their main contribution is to
provide a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with either the precision
of public or the precision of private information, starting from an arbitrary precision of these
sources. Welfare is represented as a linear combination of the volatility of the average action
and the dispersion of the individual actions.
5Ui (2009) has already built a bridge between the beauty contest literature and the team
literature (which goes back to Radner, 1962), focusing on a team problem similar to our col-
lusion benchmark. His result generalizes Cremer (1990), emphasizing that ”shared knowledge
is better than diversified knowledge if and only if a team exhibits strategic complementarity”
(Ui, 2009, p. 273).
6Our framework addresses only the first type of uncertainty.
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some implications of interest in terms of information sharing about uncertain
demand. We show indeed that information sharing – viewed, like in Angele-
tos and Pavan (2007), as an increase in the precision of public information –
is profit enhancing under both Bertrand and Cournot regimes of competition.
While this result is in line with Amir et al. (2010, Corollary 2) and finds some
empirical support in the recent though scare empirical literature (see notably
Gardete, 2016), it stands in contrast to that of most of the theoretical literature
(as developped by Gal-Or, 1985, Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1982, Li, 1985,
Sakai 1985). As emphasized by Raith (1996, p. 263) in his synthetic model,
a general result in this literature is that ”with a common value and strategic
complements, complete information pooling is an equilibrium of the two-stage
game (which is efficient from the viewpoint of the firms), regardless of all other
parameters. With a common value and strategic substitutes, no pooling is the
equilibrium solution. This solution is efficient in Cournot markets with homo-
geneous goods and inefficient for a large degree of product differentiation.” The
present article differs from this literature in several respects. First, it proposes a
more general profit function by possibly including the total profit in the objec-
tive function of each division. Second, while this literature generally considers
only private signals (and their potential revelation as multiple public signals),
the information structure of the present paper considers the simultaneous pro-
vision of public and private information, which allows analyzing how firms use
public relatively to private information. Moreover, this literature usually con-
siders prior information on demand conditions, while we do not allow for prior
information.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
set-up of the economy. Section 3 focuses on the perfect information benchmark,
emphasizing the strategy distortion generated by the competition motive, while
section 4 examines equilibrium and welfare under dispersed information, em-
phasizing the informational distortion. Section 5 concludes.
2 The economy
We consider a simple economic sector composed of a representative consumer
and a multidivisional company.
2.1 The representative consumer
We assume that the representative consumer’s utility is symmetric7 quadratic
with respect to the differentiated goods supplied by the company divisions and
quasi-linear with respect to a composite good representing the rest of the econ-
omy.
7Symmetry is a convenient but restrictive assumption. Amir and Jin (2001) and Amir et
al. (2010) compare Cournot and Bertrand equilibria, also with linear demand, but without
imposing symmetry. Asymmetry allows in particular taking firm-specific demand shocks into
account.
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The representative consumer, endowed with positive wealth w, buys at prices
p ∈ Rn++ a basket q ∈ Rn+ of n differentiated goods to the n divisions of the
company, plus a quantity z ∈ R+ of a composite numeraire good to a competitive
industry, so as to maximize, under the budget constraint pq+ z ≤ w utility
U (q, z) = u (q) + z,
with
u(q) = 2θ
n∑
i=1
qi − 1
2
n∑
i=1
q2i −
γ
2
(
n∑
i=1
qi
)2
.
The positive parameter θ is an index of market size and |γ| is the degree of
interdependence between goods, goods being substitutes if γ > 0, complements
if −1/n < γ < 0, independent if γ = 0.
The first order condition for utility maximization leads directly to the inverse
demand function for each good i = 1, ..., n:
pi = 2θ − qi − nγ 1
n
n∑
j=1
qj︸ ︷︷ ︸
q
≡ Pi (q) .
From this equation system we easily obtain the demand function for each good
i = 1, ..., n:
qi =
1
1 + nγ
2θ − (1 + nγ) pi + nγ 1n
n∑
j=1
pj︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
 ≡ Qi(p).
2.2 The multidivisional company
The company assigns as objective to each division i = 1, ..., n a convex combi-
nation of the division’s own profit and of the joint profit of all divisions. The
relative weight λ put on the former is a measure of the strength of the com-
petition motive within the organization. We thus obtain as polar cases: the
fully non-cooperative conduct (oligopolistic competition between the divisions)
for λ = 1, and the fully cooperative conduct (collusion between the divisions)
for λ = 0. More explicitly, the program of each division i is, assuming zero
production costs,
max
pi
[λpiQi (p) + (1− λ)pQ (p)] , (1)
where Q (p) ≡ (Q1 (p) , ..., Qn (p)), when divisions play in prices, and
max
qi
[λqiPi (q) + (1− λ)qP (q)] , (2)
where P (q) ≡ (P1 (q) , ..., Pn (q)), when they play in quantities.
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3 The perfect information benchmark: the com-
petition motive and the strategy distortion
We first refer to the benchmark of perfect information, considering successively
equilibrium and welfare in the price and quantity games, before directly com-
paring the two kinds of games.
3.1 Equilibrium
• The price game
Instead of referring to the program (1), we can alternatively refer to an
equivalent program consisting in minimizing the loss of the objective assigned
to division i relative to the collusive profit (obtained for λ = 0 with all prices
equal to the fundamental θ):
θQi (θ, ..., θ)− [λpiQi (p) + (1− λ)pQ (p)] = 1
1 + nγ
LP (pi, p−i, θ) ,
with p−i =
(∑
j 6=i pj
)
/ (n− 1) and the loss function LP (to be minimized in
pi)
LP (pi, p−i, θ) (3)
= (pi − θ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamental motive
+ (n− 1) γ
 (pi − p−i)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(anti-)coordination motive
+ λp−i (pi − p−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
competition motive

+ (n− 1) (1− λ)
1 + nγ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
p2j − nγp2−i − 2θp−i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
externality
.
This loss function is obviously reminiscent of the loss function introduced
by Morris and Shin (2002) in their seminal modelling of the beauty contest,
with its three motives:8 the fundamental, the coordination and the competition
8Morris and Shin (2002) loss function is indeed the sum of a fundamental, a coordination
and a competition motives:
(1− r) (ai − θ)2 + r (ai − a)2 − r 1
n
∑
j
(aj − a)2 ,
with given weights 1− r, r and −r, respectively, and involving individual and mean strategies
ai and a. An important difference with respect to our own loss function is that, by assuming
a continuum of agents, Morris and Shin make the competition motive inoperative regarding
individual decisions. Another important difference concerns aggregate losses: the competition
motive exactly balances the coordination motive in the Morris and Shin specification, so that
the fundamental motive stands alone as a component of social welfare. By contrast, the
competition motive vanishes under symmetry by aggregation of our loss functions, so that
coordination contributes in our case to agents’ welfare.
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motives.9 We formulate three remarks concerning the present loss function.
First, the fundamental motive stands naturally alone when there is a single
division (n = 1) or when the goods are independent (γ = 0). Correspondingly,
its relative weight diminishes as the level (n− 1) |γ| of interdependence between
divisions increases (either through the number n − 1 of competitors of each
division or through the degree |γ| of interdependence between goods).
Second, the coordination motive becomes in fact an anti -coordination mo-
tive when we switch from the case of substitutable goods (γ > 0) to the case of
complementary goods (γ < 0). There is however more than a simple change of
signs. An important difference between the two cases is that, as the level of in-
terdependence between divisions tends to its maximum, the fundamental motive
eventually vanishes relative to the coordination motive (since (n− 1) |γ| → ∞
as γ → ∞), whereas it always dominates the anti-coordination motive (since
(n− 1) |γ| → 1− 1/n < 1 as γ → −1/n).
Third, symmetry in strategy deviations from the targets is broken by the
competition motive, which introduces a downward (upward) bias when the co-
ordination (anti-coordination) motive prevails. The weight on the competi-
tion motive is the intensity of competition, obtained by multiplying the level
(n− 1) |γ| of interdependence between divisions and the strength λ of the com-
petition motive, thus combining two structural characteristics and a conduct
characteristic of competition.
The first order condition for minimization of LP (·, p−i, θ) gives the best
reply function
pi =
θ + (n− 1) γ (1− λ/2) p−i
1 + (n− 1) γ . (4)
Naturally, the coordination motive (for γ > 0) implies strategic complementar-
ity, and the anti-coordination motive (for γ < 0) strategic substitutability.
By symmetry (pi = p−i), we deduce from the best reply function the equilib-
rium price pP (and the corresponding quantity qP ), equal for all i and depending
upon the strength λ of the competition motive:
pP (λ) =
1
1 + (n− 1) γλ/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
KP (λ)
θ, qP (λ) =
1 + (n− 1) γλ
1 + (n− 1) γλ/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2−KP (λ)
θ
1 + nγ
. (5)
The equilibrium price pP , equal to the fundamental in the absence of the compe-
tition motive, is otherwise distorted, taking lower (higher) values in the presence
of the coordination (anti-coordination) motive, in other words under strategic
9Myatt and Wallace (2012) assume a continuum of competitors supplying differentiated
substitutes, and rewrite directly the profit function as a loss function (up to its sign):
pi ((2− β) θ − pi + βp) = − (1− β/2) (pi − θ)2 − (β/2) (pi − p)2 + (1− β/2) θ2 + (β/2) p2,
with β ∈ (0, 1). This loss function exhibits the sole fundamental and coordination motives, but
the competition motive is actually merged with the fundamental motive, since the fundamental
θ is the (monopolistically) competitive price, not the collusive price θ (1− β/2) / (1− β) as in
our framework.
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complementarity (substitutability). Of course, we obtain an opposite effect on
the equilibrium quantity qP . The distortion – a consequence of the bias intro-
duced by the competition motive – is the larger the stronger the intensity of
competition (n− 1) |γ|λ.
• The quantity game
Proceeding in the same way, we consider the loss of the objective assigned to
division i relative to the collusive profit (obtained for λ = 0 with all quantities
equal to θ/ (1 + nγ)) as
θ
1 + nγ
Pi
(
θ
1 + nγ
, ...,
θ
1 + nγ
)
− [λqiPi (q) + (1− λ)qP (q)]
= (1 + nγ)LQ (qi, q−i, θ) ,
with q−i =
(∑
j 6=i qj
)
/ (n− 1) and the loss function LQ (to be minimized in
qi)
LQ (qi, q−i, θ) (6)
=
(
qi − θ
1 + nγ
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamental motive
− (n− 1) γ
1 + nγ
 (qi − q−i)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(anti-)coordination motive
+ λq−i (qi − q−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
competition motive

+
(n− 1) (1− λ)
1 + nγ
 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
q2j + nγq
2
−i − 2θq−i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
externality
.
Again, this loss function is reminiscent of the one in the beauty contest model
of Morris and Shin (2002). The observations formulated for LP stand for LQ,
but the sign of the weight put on the coordination and competition motives is
naturally reversed, an anti -coordination motive prevailing now when goods are
substitutes. As in the price game, when the intensity of competition tends to
its maximum, this weight tends to infinity if applied to the coordination motive
but it remains dominated if applied to the anti-coordination motive.
The first order condition for minimizing LQ (·, q−i, θ) gives the best reply
function
qi =
θ − (n− 1) γ (1− λ/2) q−i
1 + γ
. (7)
As in the case of the price game, coordination generates strategic complemen-
tarity, anti-coordination strategic substitutability. By symmetry (qi = q−i), we
deduce from the best reply function the equilibrium quantity qQ (and the cor-
responding price pQ), the same for each i and depending upon the strength of
the competition motive λ:
qQ (λ) =
1
1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
KQ(λ)
θ, pQ (λ) =
1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ
1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2−(1+nγ)KQ(λ)
θ. (8)
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Observe that under full cooperation of the company divisions, pQ (0) =
pP (0) = θ and qQ (0) = qP (0) = θ/ (1 + nγ). Under perfect information and a
vanishing competition motive, it is indifferent to play in prices or in quantities.
However, if λ > 0, the equilibrium price is distorted in the same way as in the
price game. Notice further that pQ (λ) > pP (λ) independently of the nature of
the interdependence between goods: the strategy distortion is just larger under
strategic complementarity, pushing the price pP downwards when γ > 0, and
the price pQ upwards when γ < 0.
The following proposition summarizes the consequences of introducing the
competition motive in the two games.
Proposition 1 The competition motive generates a strategy distortion in both
price and quantity games: as it becomes stronger (through a larger λ), equi-
librium prices become lower (higher) and equilibrium quantities higher (lower)
when goods are substitutes (complements). This distortion increases with the in-
tensity of competition (n− 1) |γ|λ, and is larger when the coordination motive
prevails, hence under strategic complementarity (in the price game when goods
are substitutes, and in the quantity game when they are complements).
3.2 Welfare
Because of the representative consumer assumption, it is straightforward to
proceed to welfare analysis. Consumer’s utility at equilibrium quantities (be it
q∗ = qP (λ) or q∗ = qQ (λ)) can be decomposed as follows:
U(q∗, w − q∗P(q∗)) =
consumer surplus︷ ︸︸ ︷
u (q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social welfare
− q∗P(q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit
+ w. (9)
• The price game
We compute profit, social welfare and the consumer surplus successively. By
symmetry and using (5), the company profit
ΠP (λ) = npP (λ) qP (λ) =
nθ2
1 + nγ
(
2−KP (λ))KP (λ) (10)
is seen to be equal to the collusive profit nθ2/ (1 + nγ) multiplied by the factor
1 − (1−KP (λ))2, which is always smaller than one if λ > 0, and decreasing
in the intensity of competition (n− 1) |γ|λ. As expected, the company profit is
maximized at λ = 0. Social welfare
uP (λ) =
nθ2
1 + nγ
(
2−KP (λ)) (1 +KP (λ) /2) = nθ2
1 + nγ
[
2− (KP (λ))2 /2]
(11)
and the consumer surplus
uP (λ)−ΠP (λ) = nθ
2
1 + nγ
2
[
1−KP (λ) /2]2 (12)
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are by contrast increasing (decreasing) in the intensity of competition if goods
are substitutes (complements). Hence, they are both maximized at λ = 1 when
goods are substitutes, and at λ = 0 when they are complements. As already
shown by Cournot (1838, ch. IX), producers’ and consumers’ interests converge
when goods are complements, whereas they diverge when goods are substitutes.
• The quantity game
By symmetry and using (8), the company profit
ΠQ (λ) = npQ (λ) qQ (λ) =
nθ2
1 + nγ
[
1− ((1 + nγ)KQ (λ)− 1)2] (13)
is again seen to be equal to the collusive profit multiplied by a factor (between
brackets) which is always smaller than one if λ > 0, and which is decreasing in
the intensity of competition (n− 1) |γ|λ, so that profit is maximized at λ = 0.
Social welfare
uQ (λ) =
nθ2
1 + nγ
2
[
1−
(
(1 + nγ)KQ (λ)
2
− 1
)2]
(14)
and the consumer surplus
uQ (λ)−ΠQ (λ) = nθ
2
1 + nγ
(1 + nγ)
2 (
KQ (λ)
)2
2
(15)
are, as in the price game, both increasing (decreasing) in the intensity of com-
petition if goods are substitutes (complements). Hence, social welfare and con-
sumer surplus are again maximized at λ = 1 when goods are substitutes, and
at λ = 0 when they are complements.
We recall in the following proposition the preceding observations.
Proposition 2 Under perfect information, profit is decreasing in the intensity
of competition (n− 1) |γ|λ (as the strategy distortion becomes more severe) in
both price and quantity games. Social welfare and the consumer surplus are
increasing (decreasing) in the intensity of competition if goods are substitutes
(complements): the interests of the company and of the consumer diverge when
goods are substitutes, but converge when they are complements.
3.3 Price vs. quantity games
In this subsection we compare price and quantity games from a welfare perspec-
tive. Take first, using equations (10) and (13), the difference in profits obtained
when playing each kind of strategies.
ΠQ (λ)−ΠP (λ) = nθ
2
1 + nγ
((
1−KP (λ))2 − ((1 + nγ)KQ (λ)− 1)2) . (16)
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There are two cases in which this expression vanishes. The first case is when
γ = 0, entailing KP (λ) = (1 + nγ)KQ (λ) = 1 for any λ: it is indifferent to
play in quantities or in prices when goods are independent. The second is when
λ = 0, since KP (0) = (1 + nγ)KQ (0) = 1, equilibrium prices being in both
games equal to θ, as we have already pointed out. Thus, when the competition
motive is suppressed, it is indifferent for the company to play in quantities or
in prices.
Otherwise, if λ > 0, it is easy to check from (5) and (8), that KP (λ) <
1 < (1 + nγ)KQ (λ) for γ > 0, (1 + nγ)KQ (λ) < 1 < KP (λ) for γ < 0, and
KP (λ) + (1 + nγ)KQ (λ) < 2 in both cases. Hence, ΠQ (λ) − ΠP (λ) has the
sign of γ: profits will always be larger when playing in substitutable strategies,
that is, under the anti-coordination motive.
As to social welfare and the consumer surplus, using equations (11), (12),
(14) and (15), we have
uQ (λ)− uP (λ) = nθ
2
1 + nγ
(
KP (λ)
)2 − (2− (1 + nγ)KQ (λ))2
2
< 0, (17)
and (
uQ (λ)−ΠQ (λ))− (uP (λ)−ΠP (λ)) (18)
=
nθ2
1 + nγ
((
(1 + nγ)KQ (λ)
)2 − (2−KP (λ))2
2
)
< 0.
The price game is always preferable from the point of view of the consumer
and always socially optimal. Convergence of interests between the company
and the consumer when goods are complements and divergence when they are
substitutes are again apparent.
To recall,
Proposition 3 For the company as well as for the consumer, it is indifferent to
play in prices or in quantities when the goods are independent (γ = 0) or else in
the absence of the competition motive (λ = 0). Otherwise, the consumer always
prefers the price game, which is socially optimal. For the company, however,
playing under the anti-coordination motive (and thus minimizing the strategy
distortion) is preferable, so that the price game leads to a higher profit only
when goods are complements.
4 Dispersed information: the competition mo-
tive and the informational distortion
We shall now assume that the company divisions do not know the realization
θ of the fundamental, on which they only receive two noisy signals,10 a public
10As in Myatt and Wallace (2012), players are assumed to share an improper prior over
θ, which simplifies computations. We analyze the consequence of such an assumption in the
12
signal y = θ + η, with η ∼ N (0, 1/α) and a private signal xi = θ + εi, with
εi ∼ N (0, 1/β). As in Morris and Shin (2002), the random variables η and
ε1, ..., εn are independent.
11 We assume that information is imperfect (α < ∞
and β <∞), and also that it is dispersed (β > 0).
4.1 Equilibrium
Division i forms expectations on the realization θ of the fundamental, but also
on the mean strategy p−i or q−i of the other divisions, according to the game
type, by referring to the two signals y and xi. We assume that it responds
linearly to those two signals, targeting the expected best price or quantity reply
to others’ expected strategies (conditional on the two signals): pi = ζ
P
i y+ ξ
P
i xi
or qi = ζ
Q
i y+ξ
Q
i xi. This amounts for division i to choose in fact a non-negative
strategy pair
(
ζPi , ξ
P
i
)
or
(
ζQi , ξ
Q
i
)
.
• The price game
The choice of
(
ζPi , ξ
P
i
)
targets the expected best price reply, which we can
infer from equation (4):
ζPi y + ξ
P
i xi = E
(
θ + γ (1− λ/2)∑j 6=i (ζPj y + ξPj xj)
1 + (n− 1) γ
∣∣∣∣∣ y, xi
)
=
E (θ| y, xi)
(
1 + γ (1− λ/2)∑j 6=i ξPj )+ γ (1− λ/2) y∑j 6=i ζPj
1 + (n− 1) γ .
As E (θ| y, xi) = (αy + βxi) / (α+ β),
ξPi =
β
α+ β
1 + γ (1− λ/2)∑j 6=i ξPj
1 + (n− 1) γ ,
implying at equilibrium
ξPi = ξ
P =
1
1 + α/β + (n− 1) γ (λ/2 + α/β) .
Appendix, by comparing our results on the welfare effects of changes in the precision of public
and private information with those of Angeletos and Pavan (2007), who do not make the same
assumption. Also notice that we assume the same fundamental random variable θ, perturbing
the consumer’s utility function, independently of the competition regime. We thus take the
same approach as Amir et al. (2016), in contrast to most of the literature (including Angeletos
and Pavan, 2007), which approaches demand shocks under Bertrand competition through a
random intercept of the direct demand function – a derived variable.
11Assuming, as most of the literature, normality of the noise distributions may lead to
states where demand is negative. We are implicitly assuming that the signal precisions are
high enough for the probability of such an event to be small (see Vives, 1984, p. 77). Amir et
al. (2010) free themselves from specific assumptions on the distributions of shocks and signals,
but they address cost, not demand, uncertainty in a model of firm-specific information sharing.
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The next step allows us to determine
ζPi = ζ
P =
1
1 + α/β + (n− 1) γ (λ/2 + α/β)
1 + (n− 1) γ
1 + (n− 1) γ (λ/2)
α
β
.
The strategy sum
ζP + ξP =
1
1 + (n− 1) γλ/2 = K
P (λ)
does not depend upon the quality of information, as given by the precisions α
and β. It is equal to the coefficient multiplying the fundamental to obtain the
equilibrium price under perfect information. The strategy distortion with its
effects derived in the benchmark case is still at work, implying in particular
that ”the Bertrand price reacts too little to θ as compared to the monopoly
price” (Angeletos and Pavan, 2007, p. 1129), meaning in our framework that
KP (1) < KP (0), a fact which depends upon the strategy distortion and which
is not modified by the imperfection and dispersion of the information.
The novelty introduced by assuming imperfect and dispersed information
comes from the relative weights ζ/ (ξ + ζ) and ξ/ (ξ + ζ) put, respectively, on
the public and private signals, with
ζP
ξP + ζP
=
(1 + (n− 1) γ)α/β
(1 + (n− 1) γ)α/β + 1 + (n− 1) γλ/2 ≡ κ
P (λ)
and ξP /
(
ξP + ζP
)
= 1 − κP (λ). The efficient (relative) weight on the public
signal is obviously κP (0), which takes into account the fundamental and the
coordination (or anti-coordination) motives, without the competition motive.
The fundamental motive alone would lead to a relative weight on the public
signal given by its relative precision α/ (α+ β). However, for the sake of coor-
dination, and as long as the goods are substitutes (γ > 0), hence prices strategic
complements, the efficient (relative) weight on the public signal
κP (0) =
(1 + (n− 1) γ)α/β
(1 + (n− 1) γ)α/β + 1
is increasing in the level of interdependence between divisions, as measured by
(n− 1) |γ|. Obviously, it is decreasing in the level of interdependence between
divisions under the anti-coordination motive (γ < 0), hence under strategic
substitutability.
Introducing the competition motive leads to an informational distortion,
by decreasing (increasing) κP (λ) under the coordination (anti-coordination)
motive, thus by countervailing the effect of this motive. In relative terms, this
informational distortion is∣∣κP (0)− κP (λ)∣∣
κP (0)
=
(n− 1) |γ|λ/2
(1 + (n− 1) γ)α/β + 1 + (n− 1) γλ/2 ,
increasing in the intensity of competition (n− 1) |γ|λ and decreasing in the
ratio of precisions α/β.
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• The quantity game
The choice of the strategy pair
(
ζQi , ξ
Q
i
)
now targets the expected best
quantity reply, which we can infer from equation (7):
ζQy+ξQxi =
E (θ| (y, xi))
(
1− (n− 1) γ (1− λ/2) ξQ)− (n− 1) γ (1− λ/2) ζQy
1 + γ
,
so that
ξQ =
1
1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2 + (1 + γ)α/β , and
ζQ =
1
1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2 + (1 + γ)α/β
(1 + γ)α/β
1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2 ,
with a strategy sum
ζQ + ξQ =
1
1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2 = K
Q (λ) .
Again, the strategy sum does not depend upon the quality of information, and
is equal to the coefficient multiplying the fundamental in the expression for the
benchmark equilibrium quantity, so that the strategy distortion is at work, with
its effects derived when information is perfect.
As to the relative weight on the public signal, we have
ζQ
ζQ + ξQ
=
(1 + γ)α/β
(1 + γ)α/β + 1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2 = κ
Q (λ) .
Its efficient value κQ (0) is again increasing in the level of interdependence
(n− 1) |γ| under the coordination motive (now when γ < 0), hence under strate-
gic complementarity. It is decreasing under the anti-coordination motive (when
γ > 0), hence under strategic substitutability. The competition motive induces
an informational distortion, by decreasing (increasing) κQ (λ) under the coor-
dination (anti-coordination) motive, hence by countervailing the effect of this
motive. In relative terms,∣∣κQ (0)− κQ (λ)∣∣
κQ (0)
=
(n− 1) |γ|λ/2
(1 + γ)α/β + 1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2 ,
increasing in (n− 1) |γ|λ and decreasing in α/β.
To recall,
Proposition 4 Under imperfect and dispersed information, the competition
motive generates, in both price and quantity games, an informational distor-
tion which countervails the effect of the coordination (anti-coordination) motive,
making the relative weight put on the public signal inefficiently low (high) un-
der strategic complementarity (substitutability). This distortion is the stronger
the higher the intensity of competition (n− 1) |γ|λ and the lower the relative
precision α/β of the public signal.
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4.2 Welfare
Profit, social welfare and consumer surplus are defined as in the benchmark
case, but we must now refer to their mathematical expectations, conditional on
the realized θ.
• The price game
The expected profit is
E
(
ΠP
∣∣ θ) = 1
1 + nγ
E
2θ∑
i
p∗i − (1 + nγ)
∑
i
p∗2i + γ
(∑
i
p∗i
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ
 ,
with p∗i = K
P (λ)
(
θ + κP (λ) η +
(
1− κP (λ)) εi), hence equal to
E
(
ΠP
∣∣ θ) = n (KP (λ))2
1 + nγ
[(
2
KP (λ)
− 1
)
θ2 − CP
]
, (19)
where CP =
(
κP (λ)
)2
α
+ (1 + (n− 1) γ)
(
1− κP (λ))2
β
is an information cost, the only element in the expression of E
(
ΠP
∣∣ θ) which
depends upon information use and quality. Naturally, taking CP = 0, the
expected profit is the one obtained under perfect information. The information
cost is minimized in κ under the first order condition:
κ
1− κ = (1 + (n− 1) γ)
α
β
=
κP (0)
1− κP (0) .
We see that the efficient use of information by the company corresponds indeed
to λ = 0: no competition motive and no resulting informational distortion.
The expected social welfare is
E
(
uP
∣∣ θ) = E
2θ∑
i
Qi (p
∗)− 1
2
∑
i
(Qi (p
∗))2 − γ
2
(∑
i
Qi (p
∗)
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ
 ,
with Qi (p
∗) =
1
1 + nγ
(
2θ −KP (λ) (θ + κP (λ) η)
−KP (λ) (1− κP (λ)) ((1 + nγ) εi − γ∑j εj)
)
,
hence
E
(
uP
∣∣ θ) = n (KP (λ))2
2 (1 + nγ)
[(
4
(KP (λ))
2 − 1
)
θ2 − CP
]
. (20)
Again, taking CP = 0, the expected social welfare is the one obtained under
perfect information. By comparing (19) and (20), we see that the efficient use of
information by the company, minimizing the information cost CP and prevailing
in the absence of the competition motive, is socially optimal too.
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Finally, the expected consumer surplus is
E
(
uP
∣∣ θ)− E (ΠP ∣∣ θ) = n (KP (λ))2
2 (1 + nγ)
[(
2
KP (λ)
− 1
)2
θ2 + CP
]
.
Maximization in κ of the consumer surplus would now require maximization
of the information cost, constrained by equilibrium implementation, which can
only result from the corner solution λ = 1, as CP is a strictly convex function
of κ.
• The quantity game
The expected profit is now
E
(
ΠQ
∣∣ θ) = E
2θ∑
i
q∗i −
∑
i
q∗2i − γ
(∑
i
q∗i
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ
 ,
with q∗i = K
Q (λ)
(
θ + κQ (λ) η +
(
1− κQ (λ)) εi), hence equal to
E
(
ΠQ
∣∣ θ) = n (1 + nγ) (KQ (λ))2 [( 2
(1 + nγ)KQ (λ)
− 1
)
θ2 − CQ
]
,(21)
where CQ =
(
κQ (λ)
)2
α
+
1 + γ
1 + nγ
(
1− κQ (λ))2
β
is the information cost CQ, which is the only component depending upon in-
formation use and quality, and which is minimized in κ under the first order
condition:
κ
1− κ =
1 + γ
1 + nγ
α
β
=
κQ (0)
1− κQ (0) ,
with no competition motive and no resulting informational distortion, a situa-
tion corresponding to the efficient use of information by the company.
The expected social welfare is
E
(
uQ
∣∣ θ) = E
2θ∑
i
qi
∗ − 1
2
∑
i
qi
∗2 − γ
2
(∑
i
qi
∗
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ
 (22)
=
n (1 + nγ)
(
KQ (λ)
)2
2
[(
4
(1 + nγ)KQ (λ)
− 1
)
θ2 − CQ
]
,
with the sole term CQ depending on information use and quality. The efficient
use of information by the company is consequently socially optimal.
As to the expected consumer surplus, it is equal to
E
(
uQ
∣∣ θ)− E (ΠQ∣∣ θ) = n (1 + nγ) (KQ (λ))2
2
(
θ2 + CQ
)
.
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Since the information cost, the sole term depending upon information use and
quality, appears now with an opposite sign, the expected consumer surplus
would be maximized under a maximum strength λ = 1 of the competition
motive.
We summarize the preceding results of this subsection in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5 Under imperfect and dispersed information, the information
cost components of expected profit and social welfare are minimized in κ at
κP (0) and κQ (0) for the price and quantity games, respectively: efficient and
socially optimal uses of information always coincide, prevailing when the com-
petition motive is suppressed. By contrast, the consumer surplus is maximized
in κ, under the constraint of equilibrium implementation, when the competition
motive reaches its maximum strength.
4.3 The social value of information
Information quality can only influence the mathematical expectations of profit,
social welfare and consumer surplus through the cost of information, CP or
CQ according to the type of the game. Now, an increase in the information
quality (a higher precision α or β) does not necessarily diminish the informa-
tion cost because of the possible countervailing effect of a less efficient use of
information due to the informational distortion. Let us consider the two types
of game, successively.
• The price game
Recall that, according to equation (19), the information cost is
CP =
(
κP (λ)
)2
α
+ (1 + (n− 1) γ)
(
1− κP (λ))2
β
.
As
(
∂κP (λ) /∂ (α/β)
)
α/β =
(
1− κP (λ))κP (λ), we have
∂CP
∂α
= −
(
κP (λ)
)2
α2
(
1− α∂C
P
∂κ
1− κP (λ)
κP (λ)
)
and (23)
∂CP
∂β
= −
(
1− κP (λ))2
β2
(
1 + β
∂CP
∂κ
κP (λ)
1− κP (λ)
)
, (24)
so that the information cost unequivocally decreases in response to a higher
precision α or β, as long as the competition motive is inactive (λ = 0), entailing
∂CP /∂κ = 0 by optimality of κP (0). Under the coordination motive (when
γ > 0), κP (λ) < κP (0) for λ > 0, so that ∂CP /∂κ < 0 by strict convexity of
CP relative to κ. The information cost is then decreasing in the precision α of
the public signal, but not necessarily in the precision β of the private signal, a
result reversing the main conclusion of Morris and Shin (2002), obtained in a
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situation where social welfare depends upon the sole fundamental motive, given
the existence of an exact balance between the coordination and competition
motives.12
To check that the information cost may increase with more precise private
information, consider the term
β
∂CP
∂κ
κP (λ)
1− κP (λ) = −
(1 + (n− 1) γ) (n− 1) γλ
1 + (n− 1) γλ/2 κ
P (λ) , (25)
which is smaller than −1, entailing positivity of ∂CP /∂β, for a high enough
intensity of competition (with γ > 0). This result contradicts Corollary 11 in
Angeletos and Pavan (2007), which excludes in a similar context the case of
a profit depressing effect of a higher precision of the private signal. Appendix
A.2 offers a direct comparison between our result and theirs. It emphasizes in
particular the fact that in the specification of Angeletos and Pavan, one can ob-
tain a decrease in expected profits as the precision of the private signal increases
(contrary to what is stated in Corollary 11), a possibility open for a high enough
intensity of competition and a high enough precision of the public signal relative
to that of the private signal, provided the slope of the marginal cost curve is
itself large enough (entailing a high price response to demand shocks). In our
own specification, without production costs, such possibility is consequently ex-
cluded with the information structure postulated by Angeletos and Pavan, that
is, assuming prior public information on the stochastic fundamental θ. How-
ever, in the absence of prior information, the role of the posterior public signal
is reinforced, opening again the possibility that more precision of the private
signal decreases expected profits as competition becomes sufficiently intense.
Under the anti-coordination motive (when γ < 0), κP (λ) > κP (0), hence
∂CP /∂κ > 0, so that ∂CP /∂β is always negative. So is ∂CP /∂α, since
α
∂CP
∂κ
1− κP (λ)
κP (λ)
= − (n− 1) γλ (1− κP (λ)) < (1− 1/n)λ (1− κP (λ)) < 1.
• The quantity game
By equation (21), the information cost is
CQ =
(
κQ (λ)
)2
α
+
1 + γ
1 + nγ
(
1− κQ (λ))2
β
.
12See footnote 8. As the distorted relative weight κ (λ) on the public signal belongs to the
interval [α/ (α+ β) , κ (0)], the reversal of results is the natural consequence of referring to an
optimal α/ (α+ β), as in Morris and Shin (2002) instead of an optimal κ (0), as in the present
context. See also Angeletos and Pavan (2007, p. 1126) commenting on such reversal obtained
in other contexts.
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As
(
∂κQ (λ) /∂ (α/β)
)
α/β =
(
1− κQ (λ))κQ (λ), we have
∂CQ
∂α
= −
(
κQ (λ)
)2
α2
(
1− α∂C
Q
∂κ
1− κQ (λ)
κQ (λ)
)
(26)
∂CQ
∂β
= −
(
1− κQ (λ))2
β2
(
1 + β
∂CQ
∂κ
κQ (λ)
1− κQ (λ)
)
. (27)
As in the price game, the information cost unequivocally decreases in response to
a higher precision α or β, as long as the competition motive is inactive (λ = 0),
entailing ∂CQ/∂κ = 0 by optimality of κQ (0). Under the anti-coordination
motive (when γ > 0), κQ (λ) > κQ (0) for λ > 0, so that ∂CQ/∂κ > 0 by strict
convexity of CQ relative to κ. The information cost is then always decreasing
in the precisions α and β of both signals, since ∂CQ/∂β is clearly negative, and
so is ∂CQ/∂α, because
α
∂CQ
∂κ
1− κQ (λ)
κQ (λ)
=
(n− 1) γλ
1 + nγ
(
1− κQ (λ)) < 1.
This result differs from that stated in Corollary 10 of Angeletos and Pavan
(2007), admitting that the expected profit can decrease with the precision of the
public signal. The reason for this difference is formally explained in Appendix
A.1. As already emphasized for the price game, our information structure differs
slightly from theirs, as we consider no prior public information. The presence
of prior information limits the role of the public signal received a posteriori by
the players. By contrast, in the absence of such prior information, making its
variance tend to infinity in the specification of Angeletos and Pavan, the role of
the public signal is reinforced, and more precision of this signal always translates
into higher expected profits, even when competition is intense.
Under the coordination motive (when γ < 0), ∂CQ/∂κ < 0, hence ∂CQ/∂α <
0, but ∂CQ/∂β may be positive as
β
∂CQ
∂κ
κQ (λ)
1− κQ (λ) =
1 + γ
1 + nγ
(n− 1) γλ
1 + nγ − (n− 1) γλ/2κ
Q (λ) < −1 (28)
for a high enough intensity of competition (as nγ → −1).
We may now summarize the preceding results of this subsection in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 6 Variations of information quality have, in both games, the same
qualitative effects on expected profit and social welfare, and opposite effects on
expected consumer surplus. In the absence of the competition motive or else
under the anti-coordination motive, both precisions are always profit and welfare
enhancing: information has necessarily a positive social value. However, under
the coordination motive, hence under strategic complementarity, if profit and
social welfare always increase with a higher precision α of the public signal, they
decrease, for a high enough intensity of competition, when the precision β of the
private signal increases.
20
A few comments on the reasons for the results stated in this proposition are
in order. An increase in the precision of any of the two signals has a favorable
direct effect on the information cost, hence on profit and welfare, plus an indi-
rect effect (if λ > 0) through the relative weight κ (λ) (see equations (23)-(24)
for the price game and (26)-(27) for the quantity game). Under the coordination
motive, hence under strategic complementarity, κ (λ) < κ (0): the informational
distortion leads to an excessive weight put on the private signal. As this dis-
tortion is decreasing in the ratio of precisions α/β, an increase in the quality of
public – not private – information (see (25) for the price game and (28) for the
quantity game) has a favorable indirect effect on the information cost. So, we are
left with two opposite effects of an increase in the precision of the private signal.
As the intensity of competition hence the informational distortion increases, the
unfavorable indirect effect will eventually dominate. The analysis is not com-
pletely symmetric when we switch to the case of the anti-coordination motive,
a situation in which the informational distortion leads to an excessive weight
put on the public signal. This is because indefinitely increasing the intensity of
competition keeps the anti-coordination and competition motives dominated by
the fundamental motive. As a consequence, the favorable direct effects always
dominate.
4.4 Price vs. quantity games
In this subsection we compare price and quantity games from a welfare perspec-
tive. Take first, using equations (19) and (21), the difference in expected profits
obtained when playing each kind of strategies:
E
(
ΠQ
∣∣ θ)− E (ΠP ∣∣ θ) (29)
=
n
1 + nγ
[ ((
1−KP (λ))2 − ((1 + nγ)KQ (λ)− 1)2) θ2
+
(
KP (λ)
)2
CP − ((1 + nγ)KQ (λ))2 CQ
]
.
The first term in the brackets is the difference found in the benchmark perfect
information case, corresponding here to CP = CQ = 0, due either to α =∞ or
to β = ∞. We know that, when the goods are independent (γ = 0) or when
the competition motive is absent (λ = 0), KP = (1 + nγ)KQ = 1, so that we
are left with the difference CP − CQ to determine the sign of this expression.
If γ = 0, CP = CQ = 1/ (α+ β), so that it is indifferent to play in prices or
in quantities in the case of independence of goods. If λ = 0, the same is true,
provided information, if not perfect, is at least homogeneous (β = 0), since we
have then CP = CQ = 1/α.
Now, still with λ = 0 but with α <∞ and 0 < β <∞, it is straightforward
to check that the difference
CP − CQ = (2 + nγ) (n− 1)βγ
[(1 + γ)α+ (1 + nγ)β] [(1 + (n− 1) γ)α+ β]
has the sign of γ: playing under the anti-coordination motive (hence under
strategic substitutability) is better for the company. Information costs alone
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(that is, when λ = 0, leading to equal weights on CP and CQ) leads to the
same result as the one induced by the strategy distortion in the benchmark
situation of perfect information. However, as the intensity of competition in-
creases, the two combined distortions start to exert opposite effects since the
relative weight put on the higher information cost becomes lower and lower.
The previous result may then be reversed. Indeed, when goods are substitutes
(γ > 0), as the intensity of competition tends to infinity, the weight
(
KP (λ)
)2
put on CP tends to zero, so that the negative term involving CQ on the RHS
of equation (29) eventually becomes the dominant term for a large enough CQ
(for small enough precisions of the two signals). If the goods are complements
(γ < 0), as the intensity of competition tends to its upper bound (1− 1/n) /2,
the weight (1 + nγ)KQ (λ) put on CQ tends to zero, so that again the result
may be reversed for a large enough CP (for low enough precisions of the two
signals). In other words, poor information quality and high intensity of compe-
tition can result in the company preferring the game where the players obey to
a coordination motive, under strategic complementarity.
As to the expected social welfare, we use equations (20) and (22) and com-
pute:
E
(
uQ
∣∣ θ)−E (uP ∣∣ θ) = n
2 (1 + nγ)
[ ((
KP (λ)
)2 − (2− (1 + nγ)KQ (λ))2) θ2
+
(
KP (λ)
)2
CP − ((1 + nγ)KQ (λ))2 CQ
]
.
The first term in the brackets corresponds to the difference we have found in the
perfect information benchmark case (see equation (17)). It is always negative,
thus introducing a bias in favor of the game in prices, due to the presence of the
strategy distortion. The second term is identical to the corresponding term in
equation (29), for the difference between the profits obtained in the two games.
Thus, the results expressing the point of view of the company apply to social
welfare.
Finally, from the point of view of the consumer, we have:(
E
(
uQ
∣∣ θ)− E (ΠQ∣∣ θ))− (E (uP ∣∣ θ)− E (ΠP ∣∣ θ))
=
n
2 (1 + nγ)
[ ((
(1 + nγ)KQ (λ)
)2 − (2−KP (λ))2) θ2
− (KP (λ))2 CP + ((1 + nγ)KQ (λ))2 CQ
]
.
Naturally, the first term between brackets is the same as in the benchmark case,
and the second term is equal, but with an opposite sign, to the corresponding
term for the difference in social welfare and, up to a factor 1/2, for the difference
in profits.
We can now summarize the preceding results in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The pure presence of information costs, in the absence of the
competition motive, favors anti-coordination from the point of view of the com-
pany (hence, the quantity game when goods are substitutes and the price game
when they are complements). However, as the intensity of competition increases,
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this effect is reinforced by the strategy distortion, but is countervailed by the
informational distortion, which eventually reverses the result under poor infor-
mation quality. The informational distortion has the same influence on social
welfare, in spite of having an opposite influence on the consumer surplus.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a simple unified framework bridging the gap between team and
competition issues under imperfect and dispersed information, and allowing to
reconsider the social value of information in price and quantity games and to
compare their outcomes in terms of equilibrium and social welfare.
The competition motive creates, even when information is perfect, a well-
known strategy distortion and, in addition, when information is imperfect and
dispersed, an informational distortion. Both distortions are detrimental to prof-
itability, and the more so the higher the intensity of competition, through either
structure (by the degree of interdependence between goods or by the number
of competitors) or conduct (by the strength of the competition motive). The
informational distortion generated by the competition motive in both price and
quantity games is detrimental as it makes the relative weight put on the public
signal inefficiently high (low) under the anti-coordination (coordination) mo-
tive, hence under strategic substitutability (complementarity). Both distortions
interact and the dominance of one over the other depends on the information
precision and naturally lead to different effects in terms of equilibrium and social
welfare.
Regarding the social value of information, we show that increasing the pre-
cision of public information always improves welfare. By contrast, the social
value of private information may be negative under the coordination motive
(in the presence of strategic complementarity) for a high enough intensity of
competition.
While the competition motive operating under anti-coordination (in the pres-
ence of strategic substitutability) yields higher profit and social welfare when
information is perfect, imperfect and dispersed information mitigates such a
result. Indeed, if the intensity of competition is sufficiently strong and infor-
mation quality is relatively low, making the information distortion dominate
the strategy distortion, profit and social welfare are higher under coordination
(in the presence of strategic complementarity). The reverse is true from the
consumers’ point of view.
Finally, we may derive some policy implications from our findings. First,
while the results obtained earlier in the literature (e.g. Gal-Or, 1986, p. 91)
indicate that an industry has some incentives to ”create an ’association’ that
collects and publicizes information depend[ing] upon the type of competition in
the industry and the source of uncertainty in the market”, we argue that such
an association is relevant independently from the type of competition. Though
beneficial from the firms’ point of view and with regard to the overall welfare,
such an association is however detrimental in the consumers’ perspective.
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Second, our results may have some implications on the performance of the
competition regimes (price vs. quantity competition). In a context where the
company divisions have poorly accurate information on the fundamental (the
market size), they may prefer to compete in prices (quantities) if goods are
substitutes (complements). A regulator that would increase the precision of
public information might reverse such preference by reducing the weight of the
informational distortion relative to that of the strategy distortion. Again, this
would however be at the expense of the consumers.
The restriction of the analysis performed in this paper to symmetric games
and symmetric solutions is of course a limitation that we intend to remove in
further research. As structural asymmetries have already been dealt with in the
related context of firm-specific information sharing in oligopolies (Amir et al.,
2010), we think in particular of the conduct asymmetry regarding the strength
of the competition motive assigned to each division (or adopted by each firm).
How does this asymmetry impend upon the social value of public information?
Also, allowing for asymmetry in the precision of the private signals, how does an
improvement in the quality of private information benefitting to some particular
firm impact on its own profit and on the profit of its competitors? Are these
effects modulated by the corresponding strengths of the competition motive?
These are typical questions we want to address in the future.
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A The welfare effects of changes in the precision
of public and private information: A compar-
ison with Angeletos and Pavan (2007, 6.5)
In Angeletos and Pavan (2007) (henceforth AP), payoffs depend upon a stochas-
tic fundamental, which may be expressed as θ = µ+ τ , where µ is constant and
τ is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2θ . The realization θ of
the fundamental cannot be observed by the players, who receive instead a public
signal y = θ+ η and private signals xi = θ+ εi. The noises of the common and
idiosyncratic signals are normally distributed with zero mean and variances σ2y
and σ2x, respectively, and are uncorrelated between each other, as well as with
other private signals and the fundamental. In the following, it will be some-
times convenient to refer directly to the synthetic public signal z ≡ E (θ| y) =
φy + (1− φ)µ, where φ ≡ σ−2y /
(
σ−2y + σ
−2
θ
)
. The public signal z is itself nor-
mally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2z = 1/
(
σ−2y + σ
−2
θ
) ≡ 1/α. The
private posterior is also normal with mean E (θ|xi, y) = (αz + βxi) / (α+ β),
where β ≡ σ−2x , and variance Var(θ|xi, y) = 1/ (α+ β).
In what follows, we show that in the Cournot game our result on the wel-
fare enhancing effect of a higher precision of the public signal differs from that
stated in Corollary 10 of AP, because of the difference in the assumed informa-
tion structure (infinite variance σ2θ in our model against finite variance in AP).
We further show that in the Bertrand game our result on the possibly welfare
depressing effect of a higher precision of the private signal differs for the same
reason from that stated in Corollary 11 by AP. We also show that AP’s result
is not ensured, even under the assumed information structure. We provide the
details of the calculations for the Bertrand game only.
A.1 Cournot game
Following AP, the inverse demand faced by firm i, competing against a contin-
uum of identical firms which produce imperfectly substitutable goods, is given
by pi = a0 + a1θ − a2qi − a3Q, with a0, a1, a2, a3 > 0, where p is the selling
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price, q the quantity of good put by the firm in the market, Q the average quan-
tity put in the market by the competitors, and θ an exogenous demand shifter.
Individual payoffs are given by ui = piqi − c1qi − c2q2i , with c1, c2 > 0. Since
xi = µ+ τ + εi and z = φy+ (1− φ)µ = µ+ φτ + φη, the equilibrium quantity
in this model is given by:
qi = A+Bµ+B (1− κ (1− φ)) τ +B (1− κ) εi +Bκφη,
with A ≡ a0−c12(a2+c2)+a3 , B ≡ a12(a2+c2)+a3 and κ =
2(a2+c2)α
2(a2+c2)α+(2(a2+c2)+a3)β
. The
expected profit before realization of θ can then be expressed as
E (ui) = C + (a1 − (a2 + c2 + a3)B (1− κ (1− φ))) (1− κ (1− φ))Bσ2θ
− (a2 + c2)B2 (1− κ)2 σ2x − (a2 + c2 + a3)B2κ2φ2σ2y,
where C is constant in terms of the information parameters. The derivative of
this expression with respect to the precision σ−2y of the public signal y, which
can be negative according to Corollary 10 of AP, is
∂E (ui)
∂σ−2y
= (a2 + c2 + a3)B
2κ2
(
φσ2y
)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/α2
+
∂E (ui)
∂κ
∂κ
∂σ−2y
+
∂E (ui)
∂φ
∂φ
∂σ−2y
= [a2 + c2 − a3 (1− κ)]B2
(κ
α
)2
< 0 only if a2 + c2 < a3.
The latter necessary condition translates into γ > 1/ (n− 2) in the model of
our paper, where a2 = 1 + γ, a3 = (n− 1) γ and c2 = 0, meaning inten-
sive competition, due to high product substitutability and/or high number
of competitors. However, with no a priori information on the fundamental
(σ2θ = ∞, the case explored in our paper), φ = 1 and ∂φ/∂σ−2y = 0, so that
∂E(ui)
∂σ−2y
= [a2 + c2 + a3 + (a2 + c2) (1− κ)]B2
(
κ
α
)2
> 0: a higher precision of
the public signal always increases expected profits.
A.2 Bertrand game
Following AP, demand addressed to the individual firm i is qi = b0 + b1θ
′ −
b2pi+b3P , its payoff being again ui = piqi−c1qi−c2q2i or, simplifying notations,
ui = b2
[
k (θ − k + bK)− c (θ − k + bK)2
]
, with k ≡ pi − c1, K ≡ P − c1, θ ≡
b0+b1θ
′−c1(b2−b3)
b2
, b ≡ b3b2 ∈ (0, 1), and c ≡ c2/b2. The best reply is determined
by the first order condition for maximizing ui in k:
k =
1 + 2c
2 (1 + c)
E (θ|xi, y) + b 1 + 2c
2 (1 + c)
E (K|xi, y) .
Assuming linearity with respect to the received signals (ki = δ1xi + δ2z), we
have
ki = δ1xi + δ2z
=
1 + 2c
2 (1 + c)
αz + βxi
α+ β
+ b
1 + 2c
2 (1 + c)
(
δ1
αz + βxi
α+ β
+ δ2z
)
,
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so that
δ1 =
(1 + 2c)β
2 (1 + c)α+ (1 + (1− b) (1 + 2c))β
δ2 =
2 (1 + c)
2 (1 + c)− b (1 + 2c)
(1 + 2c)α
2 (1 + c)α+ (1 + (1− b) (1 + 2c))β
δ1 + δ2 =
1 + 2c
1 + (1− b) (1 + 2c) ≡ B.
We thus obtain:
ki = B

1−κ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 + (1− b) (1 + 2c))β
2 (1 + c)α+ (1 + (1− b) (1 + 2c))β xi
+
2 (1 + c)α
2 (1 + c)α+ (1 + (1− b) (1 + 2c))β︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ
z

= Bµ+B (1− κ (1− φ)) τ +B (1− κ) εi +Bκφη.
The expected profit is consequently
E (ui) = b2E
[
ki (θ − ki + bK)− c (θ − ki + bK)2
]
= C + b2
( −c+B (1− κ (1− φ)) (1 + 2c (1− b))
−B2 (1− κ (1− φ))2 (1− b) (1 + c (1− b))
)
σ2θ
−b2 (1 + c)B2 (1− κ)2 σ2x − b2 (1− b) (1 + c (1− b))B2κ2φ2σ2y.
The derivative of this expression with respect to the precision σ−2x of the private
signal xi, positive according to Corollary 11 of AP, is
∂E (ui)
∂σ−2x
= b2 (1 + c)B
2
(
1− κ
β
)2
+
∂E (ui)
∂κ
∂κ
∂σ−2x
,
with
∂E (ui)
∂κ
∂κ
∂σ−2x
= −κ (1− κ)
β
×
b2
( − (1 + 2c (1− b))
+2B (1− κ (1− φ)) (1− b) (1 + c (1− b))
)
B
1/α︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− φ)σ2θ
+2b2 (1 + c)B
2 (1− κ) σ2x︸︷︷︸
1/β
− 2b2 (1− b) (1 + c (1− b))B2κφφσ2y︸︷︷︸
1/α
 ,
so that
∂E (ui)
∂σ−2x
=
[
1/2 + c (1− 2b)
+ (1 + 2c− 2B (1− b) (1 + c (1− b))) (1− κ)
]
b2B
κ (1− κ)
αβ
.
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The sign of ∂E [ui] /∂σ−2x can be negative, if κ is close to 1 (if the precision
of the public signal relative to the private one is very high) and if b is itself
close to 1 (if competition is very intense), provided c > 1/2 (highly increasing
marginal cost, magnifying the price response to a shock in the fundamental).
This invalidates Corollary 11 of AP.
In our own specification, c = 0, so that the sign of ∂E (ui) /∂σ−2x is always
positive as long as σ2θ <∞. However, if we take the case of no a priori informa-
tion, which implies φ = 1, the coefficient of σ2θ in E (ui) ceases to depend upon κ
and becomes independent from the information parameters. As a consequence,
we have
∂E (ui)
∂σ−2x
= [1/2 + (1− b) (1/2 + c) + ((1− b) (1− 2bc)− 1)κ] b2B2κ (1− κ)
αβ
,
with the sign of 2− b (1 + 2κ) for c = 0. Again, this expression is negative if b
and κ are both close enough to 1.
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